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Perfecting the Administrative Solution 
to Labour Disputes 
Postscript 
P.A. Joseph 
«The judges lack the intimate knowledge ofthe very dynamic 
process ofindustrial relations and collective bargaining. For thèse 
reasons...the new labour code has removed the court's jurisdic-
tion over labour disputes...The new law seeks an administrative 
rather than a judicial solution to labour disputes.»** 
Subséquent to the time of writing of the author's article «Perfecting the 
Administrative Solution to Labour Disputes: The British Columbia Ex-
periment», published in volume 38, number 2, Relations Industrielles/In-
dustrial Relations, the Suprême Court of Canada delivered its hallmark 
décision in Crevier v Attorney-General for Québec et ai1. The issue for the 
Suprême Court was whether the Professions Tribunal, a provincially con-
stituted body established under the Québec Professional Code,2 could com-
petently exercise the extensive powers conferred upon it, or whether thèse 
were such as to offend section 96 of the British North America Act, 1867. 
Delivering judgment of the Court, Laskin C. J.C. acknowledged in Canada 
the «académie concern with the permitted scope of privative clauses»,3 that 
«[ojpinion has varied»,4 and reflected of the décision rendered: «...this is 
tne first time that this Court has declared unequivocally that a provincially-
constituted statutory tribunal cannot constitutionally be immunized from 
review of décisions on questions of jurisdictions»5. 
* JOSEPH, P.A., Faculty of Law, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. 
** BRITISH COLUMBIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1973) (Third Ses-
sion), at 399-400 per the Hon. W.S. King, Minister of Labour. 
î (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1, per Laskin C.J.C., Martland, Ritchie Dickson, Beetz, 
Estey, Mclntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ. 
2 R.S.Q. 1977, C.C-26, s. 162. 
3 Supra, note 1, at 14. 
4 Ibid, citing the articles infra, note 29. 
5 Ibid, at 13. 
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Thus resolved also was the lingering constitutional question underlying 
the privative provisions of the British Columbia Labour Code6. In placing 
the provincially-constituted statutory tribunal against the broader 
background of Canadian constitutional law, Crevier effectively disposes of 
any pretense to perfect the administrative solution to labour disputes 
through novel formulations of the privative clause7. The following 
postscript to the writer's article reflects briefly on the décision rendered and 
what it will mean for labour statutes committed to the administrative solu-
tion. 
THE DECISION IN CREVIER 
The Professions Tribunal established under the Québec Professional 
Code was granted powers to confirm, alter, or quash any décision by a 
discipline committee constituted under the Code. Included for thèse pur-
poses were powers encompassing review of fact or law and jurisdiction,8 the 
exercise of which was reinforced by a privative provision ousting judicial 
review9. 
The Québec Court of Appeal availed itself of the usual construction 
placed on privative clauses and held10 that the language employed did not 
contemplate foreclosing the Superior Court's review where there had been a 
want or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Professionals Tribunal. The 
Suprême Court disagreed. As a matter of ordinary construction, said 
Laskin C.J.C., «[t]hat is not the case, having regard to the embrasive terms 
of s. 194 of the Professional Code»n. This rejection of the Court of 
Appeal's interprétation invitée! the Suprême Court's further finding,12 that 
«... it is...impossible to see the [Professions Tribunal's] final appellate 
jurisdiction as part of an institutional arrangement by way of a regulatory 
scheme for the governance of the various professions»:13 
6 S.B.C. 1973, c. 122. 
7 See generally the writer's examination, volume 38, number 2, Relations Industriel-
les/Industrial Relations. 
8 See ss. 175, 194 and 195 of the Québec Professional Code. 
9 Section 194. 
10 [1979] Que. C.A. 333, per Pare, J.A. and Jacques J., ad hoc (Montgomery J.A. 
dissenting), reversing a judgment of Poitras, J., [ 1977] Que. S.C. 324. 
11 Supra, note 1, at 8. 
12 Distinguishing Tomko v Labour Relations Board (Nova Scotia) et al. (1975) 69 
D.L.R. (3d) 250, [ 1977] 1 S.C.R. 112, 14 N.S.R. (2d) 191. 
13 Supra, note 1, at 11. 
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«The Professions Tribunal is not so much integrated into any scheme as it is sitting 
on top of the various schemes and with an authority detached from them, although, 
of course, exercising that authority in relation to each scheme as the occasion re-
quires. There is no valid comparison with the cease and desist orders which the 
Labour Relations Board in the Tomko cases was authorised to issue in its ad-
ministration of a collective bargaining statute.»14 
Reflecting on the background jurisprudence underpinning the privative 
clause in Canada, Laskin C.J.C. observed, «This Court has hitherto been 
content to look at privative clauses in terms of proper construction and, no 
doubt, with a disposition to read them narrowly against the long history of 
judicial review on questions of law and questions of jurisdiction»15. Of the 
«section 96» challenge, «It is enough to deflect s.96 if the privative clause is 
construed to préserve Superior Court supervision over questions of jurisdic-
tion...»16. What if, however, as in the instant case, the language is too 
spécifie to admit of such a construction? «[I]s the clause constitutionally 
valid?» asked Laskin C.J.C.17 Citing Attorney-General for Québec et al. v. 
Farrah et ai,I8 Laskin C.J.C. replied: 
«In my opinion, where a provincial Législature purports to insulate one of its 
statutory tribunals from any curial review of its adjudicative functions, the insula-
tion encompassing jurisdiction, such provincial législation must be struck down as 
unconstitutional by reason of having the effect of constituting the tribunal a s.96 
Court. ...this is the first time this Court has declared unequivocally that a 
provincially-constituted statutory tribunal cannot constitutionally be immunized 
from review of décisions on questions of jurisdiction.»19 
LASKIN C.J.C.'s VOLTE-FACE? 
It is ironie that it was Professor Bora Laskin (as he then was) who once 
observed the «apparent futility» of the initial attempts in Canada to oust 
the court's jurisdiction over matters assigned to the labour board20. «In the 
face of such enactments», Laskin cautioned, «judicial persistence in exercis-
ing a reviewing power involves an arrogation of authority only on the basis 
of constitutional principle (and there is no such principle) or on the basis of 
some 'élite' theory of knowing what is best for ail concerned» (the paren-
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, at 14. 
16 Ibid, at 12. 
n Ibid. 
18 (1978) 86 D.L .R. (3d) 161, [ l 9 7 8 ] 2 S.C.R. 638, 21 N .R . 595. 
19 Supra, note 1, at 12 and 13. 
20 Laskin, Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of the Privative Clause, 
30 Can. B. Rev. 986, (1952). 
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thesis is Laskin's)21. The irony is that three décades hence Bora Laskin qua 
Chief Justice of Canada delivers the very décision of the Suprême Court22 
unequivocally affirming just such a principle. In 1952 he was adamant. «We 
must not...delude ourselves», he instructed, «that judicial review rests on 
any higher ground than that of being implicit in statutory interprétation»:23 
«We may well feel that judicial supremacy is the highest of ail values under a 
démocratie régime of law, and a value to which even the législature should pay 
tribute. But we hâve not enshrined it in any fundamental constitutional law or in our 
political System. On the contrary, the cardinal principle of our system of représen-
tative government, inherited from Great Britain, has been the supremacy of the 
législature. In Canada this has been modified only through a distribution of 
législative power consonant with federalism and by a few guaranties such as those 
relating to éducation, language and the independence of the judiciary. We must not 
then delude ourselves...»24 
Perhaps the saving qualification in that quotation is Laskin's gênerai 
référence to Canada's distribution of législative power. But Laskin was at 
pains to dispel any suggestion that this, or any aspect of the Canadian con-
stitutional setup, abridged his «cardinal principle» of législative supremacy 
for the spécifie purpose of enjoining judicial obédience to the privative 
clause. In addition to the above statement berating courts for their disobe-
dience and disavowing any constitutional justification for their «per-
sistence»,25 Laskin reiterated: «At the threshold of this inquiry it may be 
well to make the assertion that there is no constitutional principle on which 
courts can rest any claim to review administrative board décisions»26. 
Whilst he did concède that in constitutional matters involving the distribu-
tion of législative power judicial supremacy is «an accepted fact»,27 he con-
cluded: «Yet the question remains why the courts, as one agency of govern-
ment, should not respect the authority and responsibility of another agency, 
the législature, in matters where no issue of distribution of législative power 
arise»28. 
The very minimum judicial office implies is independence of thought; 
even from one's own earlier views if necessary. Crevier bears witness. Yet it 
does not seem from Crevier that ivory tower conjecture is simply to be ig-
21 Ibid, 3X991. 
22 Crevier, supra, note 1. 
23 Supra, note 20, at 990. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, at 991. 
26 Ibid, at 989. 
27 Ibid, at 1002. 
28 Ibid. 
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nored with impunity, for Laskin C.J.C. saw fit to cite four publications29 
expressing, as his Honour himself put it, «académie concern with the per-
mitted scope of the privative clause»30. Since thèse represent the spectrum of 
thought on the question, dating indeed from the time of his Honour's own 
publication, one wonders with respect whether it really would hâve been 
judicially improper for the Chief Justice to hâve included, amid the cita-
tions given, référence to his own critique. 
AFTER CREVIER 
There is little use now in pleading for judicial récognition of the 
législative policy underlying section 33 of the British Columbia Code31. In 
fact, on the strength of Crevier one must speculate whether those provisions 
of the Labour Code which emphatically prélude review even on jurisdic-
tional grounds are any longer constitutionally valid. Can thèse reasonably 
be construed to préserve Superior Court supervision over the Board's 
jurisdiction? On the foregoing examination it is submitted not32. 
Accordingly it seems that the sole focus now must be on the distinction 
between errors of law within jurisdiction and jurisdictional error: the 
former may be validly insulated from judicial review, the latter not. 
Herewith the British Columbia Board must be resigned to the freedom 
which the conceptualism of Anisminic33 gives courts to gratuitously in-
terfère in issues of labour relations policy more appropriately referred to the 
administrative agency; lest it be forgotten it was judicial enthusiasm for this 
freedom that caused British Columbia in 1973 to experiment with its novel 
method of foreclosing judicial intervention on grounds of jurisdiction. (Is it 
not also significant that in the two cases in which the Suprême Court has 
upheld the législature^ intent and ruled in favour of the privative clause 
precluding ail curial review, it has been for purposes of upholding the «sec-
tion 96» challenge to the agency's jurisdiction?34) 
29 Viz. (in order in which they are cited), Lyon, Comments, 49 Can. B. Rev. 365 (1971); 
Lederman, The Independence ofthe Judiciairy, 34 Can. B. Rev. 1139 (1956); Hogg, Is Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action Guaranteed by the British North America Act? 54 Can. B. 
Rev. 716 (1976); Dussault, Le Contrôle Judiciaire de l'Administration au Québec (1969) 
especially at 110-13. 
30 Supra, note 1, at 14. 
31 See generally the writer's article, supra. 
32 Ibid. 
33 1969 2 A.C. 147 (H.L.). 
34 Attorney-Generalfor Québec et al v Farrah et al., supra, note 18; Crevier v Attorney-
Generalfor Québec et al., supra, note 1. 
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On the other hand, perhaps there has been more cause for optimism ex-
hibited recently in cases such as C. U.P.E. Local 963 v New Brunswick Li-
quor Corporation*5 where the Suprême Court willingly deferred to the ex-
pertise of the Labour Relations Board in specialist matters confided to it. 
Perhaps this suggests that courts will not now interfère with Board décisions 
unless the error obviously goes to jurisdiction? But the fact remains that no 
matter how tolérant the courts or extensive the judicial goodwill, the déci-
sion is nonetheless their's, the judges', to résolve what is jurisdictional and 
what is not. And history may well hâve it that this dépends as much on the 
state of the judge's indigestion as any légal considération. 
COMMENT 
In retrospect the balance of académie opinion in British Columbia 
prior to Crevier possibly supported the argument eventually upheld there, 
such that the «section 96» challenge to the British Columbia Board's 
jurisdiction may well hâve been more a question of «when» than «if». But 
whatever once was conjecture is now reality — henceforth the Code's provi-
sions must be read subject to what this décision establishes for the 
provincially-constituted statutory body. On the other hand, the décision 
merits no spécial attention outside of Canada where the «section 96» pro-
blem does not arise and the sole issue is the appropriate drafting of an effec-
tive privative clause. 
35 25 N.B.R. (2d) 237 (1979). 
